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Anselmian Explorations, Essays in Philosophical Theology, by Thomas V. 
Morris. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987. Pp. 264. 
Cloth, $28.95. 
RICHARD SWINBURNE, University of Oxford. 
Thomas Morris obtained his Ph. D. in December 1980; since then we have had 
two. books, Understanding Identity Statements and The Logic of God Incarnate, 
and a large number of articles. Some of these latter have been collected (together 
with two previously unpublished essays) into the present volume. It is a consid-
erable compliment to a young philosopher for a publisher to produce a collection 
of his essays on separate themes. 
Although the twelve essays are separate, Morris claims that they all have a unity 
of approach to philosophical theology, which he characterizes as 'Anselmian,' 
in the sense of "beginning with and employing at every point" the concept of God 
as "a greatest possible, or absolutely perfect, being"; and in treating "the docu-
ments of the Bible and the traditions of the church as providing vitally important 
and inviolable standards for theological reflection." The majority of these essays 
are Anselmian in the first respect, of their concern with divine perfection. "Duty 
and Divine Goodness" argues that God's goodness is analogical to moral good-
ness, in that it consists (as well as in performing supererogatory acts) in con-
forming to principles, which are principles of duty for lesser beings. "Perfection 
and Power" claims that God's inability to sin does not entail that God lacks some 
power. "Properties, Modalities and God" defines a property as "enduring" if an 
individual who has it cannot in future cease to have it, and "immemorial" if an 
individual who has it must always have had it; and it develops these distinctions 
carefully. It then argues that even if sinlessness is not a necessary property of God, 
it is an enduring one; if God is ever sinless, he is always in future sinless. However, 
Morris also claims in "The Necessity of God's Goodness" that theists have modal 
intuitions, which they are justified in taking to be reliable, that God is necessarily 
good. Such modal intuitions lead to ontological arguments; and one way of 
attacking an argument to the existence of God, familiar since Gaunilo, is to claim 
that if it works, then, by parity of argument, many other ontological arguments to 
the existence of lesser beings would also work. In "Necessary Beings" Morris 
defends ontological arguments to the existence of God against a recent attack of 
this form by Kane. In "On God and Mann" Morris considers Mann's recent de-
fence of "divine simplicity" in the sense of God being identical with each of his 
attributes, and claims that this doctrine cannot be spelled out coherently in any 
careful way. "Absolute Creation" claims that the theist can coherently hold not 
merely that God creates the contingent universe but also that he creates such 
necessarily existent abstract entities as properties and propositions. "Creation ex 
nihilo" claims that it is reasonable to believe that God brought about the beginning 
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of the existence of the Universe in 15 billion B.C., while not being reasonable to 
believe that the Universe came into existence five minutes ago. "God and the 
World" looks at Process Theology and claims that its insights can be taken on 
board without much difficulty by a traditional theistic metaphysics, and do not 
require us to adopt instead the metaphysics of Process Theology. The remaining 
essays are concerned with taking "the God of the philosophers" as the Judaeo-
Christian God. 'The God of Abraham, Isaac and Anselm" claims that it can be 
reasonable to identify these two Gods. "Rationality and the Christian Revelation" 
claims that the Christian theist will be rational in believing that God became incar-
nate in Christ if prayer and Gospel reading move him so to believe. "Pascalian 
Wagering" claims that Pascal's wager presented in a sensible form gives good 
reason for leading the Christian life. 
Morris writes very clearly and simply. His account of the issues and the views 
of philosophers about them are exemplary; and beginning students should find 
much of value in all the essays. More professional philosophers will find some 
valuable things in some of the essays. For example, "Properties, Modalities, 
and God" provides some very useful new distinctions for discussing the divine 
attributes. "Duty and Divine Goodness" and "On God and Mann" provide very 
sensible accounts of two issues about the divine nature. Others of the essays 
however are far too thin and reach sweeping conclusions in a most breath-taking 
way without any adequate discussion of obvious difficulties. "Rationality and 
the Christian Revelation" just jumps to its suggested conclusion that even if no 
argument can show that Jesus is God Incarnate, nevertheless if on reading the 
Gospels you are moved so to believe, believing will be rational. Even those of 
us who have defended a "principle of credulity" (that in general one ought to 
believe any proposition which seems to one to be the case-in the absence of 
any counter-argument) may be a little aghast at what is in effect Morris' appli-
cation of the principle. It can't be applied where there are probable rival expla-
nations of why things so seem to the subject which do not depend for their effect 
on the truth of the proposition believed. In this case we know very well why it 
often seems to those reading the Gospels that Jesus is God Incarnate-they are 
caused so to believe by the institutional context of church and creed in which 
they read the Gospels. As Morris says: "a full account of the epistemic status 
of Christian doctrine would be quite complex ... the remarks of the present 
essay have been laid out in broad strokes and have hinted at no more than a 
very few elements of such an account." "Hinted" is indeed the word. 
Other essays reveal Morris' confidence in "modal intuitions," intuitions about 
what is possible or necessary in a "broadly logical" sense. Kane's argument was 
that if it is possible that there exist a necessary being who has all the divine proper-
ties such as omnipotence and omniscience (and hence it is necessary that there exist 
such a being), then it is possible that there exist a necessary being who has only 
some ofthe divine properties or has lesser degrees ofthem (and so again it is neces-
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sary that there exist such a being). Morris' answer is that "Anselmians" have a 
modal intuition that the former necessary being, viz. God, is possible, but lack 
modal intuitions that lesser necessary beings are possible. Modal intuitions are in 
general to be trusted, especially if an account can be given as to how we come to 
have them which shows how they are formed by a reliable belief-producing mech-
anism; and if there is a God, it might well be expected that God (p. 190) "render us 
at least capable under the right conditions of having reliable intuitions such as 
those which yield the Anselmian conception of God and provide a modal argument 
to his existence." 
Now we do indeed have modal intuitions about logical possibility and impossi-
bility, in the sense of intuitions about what entails or does not entail a self-contra-
diction, and intuitions about logical necessity, in the sense of intuitions about the 
negation of some proposition entailing a self-contradiction. Such intuitions (in 
accord with a principle of credulity) provide our initial grounds for our views about 
what is logically possible or necessary, and our considered judgments are formed 
by systematizing these intuitions. But Morris claims that there are intuitions of 
"broadly logical possibility," which seems to be a much wider sort of "logical" 
possibility than the narrow sort of logical possibility which I have just delineated. 
I say "seems" because Morris makes no attempt to define his "broadly logical possi-
bility" and say what makes it a "logical" possibility. He merely contrasts it with 
"consistency in first order logic" and gives examples of it. Clearly there is logical 
possibility in my sense, other than "consistency in first order logic." There is plenty 
of consistency, entailment and self-contradiction around other than that captured 
by first-order logic. The role offirst-order logic, or any other logical calculus, is to 
formalize preexisting consistency, entailment and self-contradiction; and there is 
plenty which has not yet been formalized and perhaps never will be. "This is red" 
entails "This is coloured," even if first-order logic cannot explain how. 
My grounds for saying that Morris seems to have in mind by "broadly logical 
possibility" a kind of possibility wider than my narrow kind are some of the 
examples of it which he gives (see below), the fact that he contrasts it sometimes 
with "consistency" simpliciter (rather than with "consistency in first-order logic") 
and the use to which he puts it-his argument against Kane has no plausibility 
if we equate his "broadly logical possibility" with my narrow logical possibility. 
So the questions arise as to what is meant by saying that there is a "logical" 
necessity and possibility beyond my narrow kind, whether there is such logical 
necessity and possibility, and how we can know about it. And it is no good 
attempting to solve these issues by saying that a proposition is logically necessary 
if it holds in all possible worlds, since presumably "possible worlds" is to be 
read as "logically possible worlds"; the definition is circular and the circle too 
small to provide illumination. 
Morris attempts to support his claim that there is "broadly logical possibility" 
by giving three kinds of examples of it. One example (p. 184) is "the example 
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of mathematical propoSltions such as Goldbach's conjecture, the continuum 
hypothesis, the Axiom of Choice, and Fermat's Last Theorem which are such 
that either they, or their negations are impossible, without either being formally 
inconsistent." But these just seem to be propositions such that they or their 
negations are inconsistent, but not "formally" (in the sense of "in first-order 
logic") inconsistent. Their impossibility or necessity is logical in my narrow sense. 
Morris' second example is that the proposition that water is not H20 is impos-
sible. And this proposition is, of course, a member of that genus of propositions 
about the natures of individuals and natural kinds which Putnam and Kripke 
have drawn to our attention. My view of such propositions is that their necessity 
or whatever is analysable in terms of entailments of the defining characteristics 
of the objects or kinds in fact picked out by the names in sentences which express 
the propositions. There is no new kind of necessity here beyond narrow logical 
necessity. That view will be disputed; and Morris presumably cites these examples 
because he accepts the view of those who have put them forward as illustrating 
a new kind of necessity. But note that those who have claimed that there is here 
a new kind of necessity have also insisted that knowledge of it is a posteriori. 
Mere "intuition" will not reveal that water is H20. Morris' third example of 
"broadly logical" modality is the necessity that Socrates is a person. Now maybe 
it is among the linguistic rules for the use of the word "Socrates" that an object 
only counts as Socrates if it is a person; and in that case we have narrow logical 
necessity. But if this is not among the rules, but application of the rules in fact 
picks out a person, then the necessity of this proposition is like that of "Water 
is H20; and a posteriori. So even if Morris were by his examples to have shown 
that there is a broad "logical" modality, his examples are not ones where mere 
reflection can detect the modality. Indeed, what was regarded by some as scan-
dalous about the suggestions of Kripke and Putnam that there was necessity 
beyond the narrow logical was just that it was only detectable a posteriori. There 
is no analogy outside theology for the claim that "modal intuition" can reveal 
other than narrow logical necessity, and that casts very considerable doubt on 
whether modal intuition can discover anything beyond the narrowly logical in 
the realm of theology. Morris needs to explain what "broadly logical necessity" 
is, and to justify his confidence in the power of "modal intuition" to reveal it. 
In fairness to Morris I should add that he is not alone in his confidence that he 
understands what is meant by "broadly logical necessity" and that intuition is 
able to reveal it. As far as I know, the phrase "broadly logical necessity" got 
its baptism in the philosophy of religion on p. 2 of Alvin Plantinga' s The Nature 
of Necessity. Since then so many philosophers of religion have come to believe 
that they knew what this kind of "logical" necessity was, and have grown ever 
more confident in the power of "intuition" to reveal it. They need to think the 
issue through more thoroughly than Morris has done in this volume. 
